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Programming decisions by international NGOs operating in the area of development are a function 
of both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns. Helping communities establish sustainable 
agricultural cooperatives to address problems of undernutrition, for example, motivates programs 
implemented by NGOs in the food security sector. But NGOs are strategic actors and must also be 
attentive to organizational imperatives in regard to funding. These concerns relate to donor 
preferences and the reality that aid projects must demonstrate tangible results. This paper examines 
the network of organizations responding to the needs of the one billion people worldwide who live 
in food insecure environments.  We focus on the activities of 47 North America-based NGOs (both 
secular and religious) and a mix of 99 governmental and nongovernmental donors. We consider the 
extent to which both internal resources (finances, staff and volunteers) and external relations (social 
capital) enhance NGO effectiveness in reaching people in need. The study employs some descriptive 
techniques from Social Network Analysis (SNA) to illuminate the structural features of the food 
security network. We begin to identify the network characteristics and NGO attributes that best 
explain success in promoting of food security and draw some tentative conclusions about the 
balance of internal and external resources employed in combatting global hunger.
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NGOs in the Transnational Development Network: Exploring Relational Resources in the 
Promotion of Food Security 
 
Introduction: NGOs in World Politics  
Nongovernmental Organizations are important actors in global politics. As international actors, they 
challenge traditional conceptions of power in international relations theory. International NGOs 
respond to global emergencies where states are unable or unwilling to act, sometimes changing the 
policy decisions of states. Together, they propel the emergence of new norms in an age of 
interdependence among states. Currently, NGOs are key actors responding to global crises including 
climate change, poverty and hunger, the AIDS epidemic, and catastrophic natural disasters including 
multiple tsunamis and earthquakes. It is an understatement to say that these organizations are 
essential to global governance, adding to global society’s capacity to respond to natural and human-
made emergencies. NGOs play many roles in international politics; they are policy activists, public 
educators, agenda-setters, monitors, project implementers and watchdogs (e.g., Spiro 1995). The 
variety of roles they play highlights their unique position in the governance system as catalyst of 
change. Understanding how and why NGOs matter means taking a nuanced view of the 
international system whereby NGOs are among the many players facing constraints and 
opportunities to effect change in countries suffering and recovering from conflict, catastrophes, and 
poverty.  
The global NGO sector has grown rapidly since the end of World War II, and exponentially 
since the end of the Cold War.1 Most of these organizations are located in North America and 
Europe, although a few large INGOs are located in Africa2. There are rival hypotheses regarding 
why this increase has evolved, however, most scholars argue that it is due to a declining state 
                                                        
1
 There are roughly 45,674 international NGOs (see Ahmed and Potter 2006; Boli and Thomas 1999; UIA statistics).  
2 Africare is one example of a large SNGO.  
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structure, moving towards a multipolar world (Willetts 2001; Lee 2006; Economist 1999; Mathews 
1997; Risse-Kappen 1995). The supposed decline makes room for nonstate actors to participate in 
traditionally state-centered activities, such as security and economic development. Some argue the 
rise is partly due to globalization and our ability to communicate and travel across borders with ease 
(Singer 2002; Rosenau 1980). Others believe that increased affluence and professionalization are 
responsible. Turner (2010), for example, finds a correlation between the number of advanced 
degrees awarded worldwide and the number of INGOs. Salamon (2006) argues that INGO growth 
is due to three factors: the global communication revolution, the retreat of the nation-state and 
economic growth or affluence.  
A more powerful explanation relates to the international institutional structures developed to 
support NGO participation. This argument suggests that with the formation of the League of 
Nations after World War I, nongovernmental participation was encouraged, setting the stage for 
future development of the NGO community. When the United Nations picked where the League 
left off, NGOs found a permanent home in an institutional structure theretofore dominated by 
states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). During the drafting of the UN charter, NGOs 
were invited to participate and were instrumental in formulating the preamble. Subsequently, the 
UN, through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), created an NGO branch 
institutionalizing the partnership. The NGO charter, under Article 71, entitles NGOs to act as 
consultants to the UN on a variety of policy issues (Spiro 1995). Currently, over one thousand 
NGOs have consultative status, which is far greater than the ninety participating in 1949.  
Additionally, government support for NGOs grew during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1973, the 
U.S. Congress mandated a “new direction” for development and switched to supporting NGOs 
directly, rather than through large bureaucratic aid agencies. NGOs, the Congress believed, were in a 
better position to reach the poorest of the poor worldwide. The 1980s were coined the 
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“development decade” and NGOs seemed to become a favored partner of governments. The 
transition was reflected in the levels of official development assistance (ODA) to NGOs, which 
grew from $1 billion in 1970 to $7 billion in 1990 (Ahmed and Potter 2006).3 Additional resources 
created opportunities for NGOs to participate more broadly and influence global culture.  
The rise of NGOs and their partnerships with states and IGOs has created momentum for 
the expansion of a global civil society characterized by a variety of horizontal relationships alongside 
vertical power structures. Global civil society gives rise to collective action by groups whose 
activities are held together by common purposes. Global civil society is said to be located outside the 
state, but above individual nonstate actors. Keck and Sikkink (1998) take the idea further and 
suggest that the linkages among these actors in world politics form networks. Their concept of 
transnational advocacy networks suggests that NGOs and their interactions fall somewhere between 
civil society, domestic governments, and international organization. Here, the unique interplay 
between communities, governments, and international NGOs forms a unique organization form, 
with actors working in both collaboration and competition to address such issues as global hunger. 
The next section is a general discussion of the role that NGOs play in the food security 
network and the special challenges they face as organizations and international actors with 
humanitarian purposes. The two sections that follow address questions such as what it takes to 
thrive in this political and organizational environment, what it means to be influential, and the sorts 
of internal and external resources NGOs have at their disposal to carry out their missions. The 
second part of the paper presents some initial analyses of data we are compiling on the food security 
network. We discuss issues relating to the operationalization of links between and among the 
primary nodes in this network, international NGOs and donors, and present some findings 
highlighting the most prominent of these network actors. We also offer some preliminary results on 
                                                        
3
 “In 1992, NGOs provided $8.3 billion in aid to developing countries, representing 13 percent of development 
assistance worldwide. Securing government action is no longer always necessary to the bottom line” (Spiro 1995, p. 4).  
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the predictors of NGOs’ food aid activities and reach, including the relative importance of their 
material resources and social capital.  
 
The Food Security Network 
There are one billion hungry people in the world, 90 percent of whom are chronically hungry and 
malnourished. This is more than the population of the United States, Canada, and the EU combined 
(The Hunger Project 2011). Currently, 35 million people live with HIV/AIDS worldwide—not even 
half the number affected by malnutrition. In addition, of the world’s 1.4 billion poor, 75 percent live 
in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture and related activities (FAO Report 2010).  Currently, 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) number 1 is to reduce global poverty and hunger, 
illustrating the prominence of the issue and the necessity of a structured response.  
 Policy decisions regarding global hunger have oscillated between state-centric models and 
humanitarian-centered approaches.  In the Unites States, for example, cash assistance is generally 
not supported by donor agencies (see Public Law 480).  Instead, food aid remains the traditional 
mechanism for addressing global hunger.  This creates a self-interested, state-centric response to 
dispose of excess production in developing countries rather than focusing on local needs.  
Development experts have long argued that addressing poverty and hunger requires developing 
sustainable solutions and markets for local production. Simply providing long-term food aid does 
little to alleviate pain and suffering long term. Humanitarian responses, however, assist in the 
development of local mechanisms to systematically reduce malnutrition.  These projects tend to 
focus on developing sustainable agricultural systems, strengthening local markets and building 
capacity.  Although projects focused on development and humanitarianism receive greater praise, 
they often require seeking funding from donor agencies outside the United States, or the ability to 
generate private resources.  
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 The community involved in the fight against hunger is complex. The main actors are NGOs, 
although the NGO community in the food security sector is characterized by a high degree of 
inequality in resource possession and effectiveness (Duffield 1990). The connections they share, 
however, interject optimism into the development debate. “[T]he epistemic networks and 
operational linkages between NGOs, which bind practitioners and shape the humanitarian agenda 
irrespective of individual mandates, donors and governance, may hold the most potential for 
building bridges across the community’s divisions” (Stoddard 2003: 4).  
 International NGOs often operate within a flat international social structure. Communication 
patterns and linkages between NGOs and other actors (donors, other NGOs, and local partners) 
becomes important to the effective implementation of aid projects. The NGO network in the 1980s 
and 1990s was primarily comprised of larger international NGOs based in northern states (often 
referred to as NNGOs) and donors. Recently, with the push towards empowerment and sustainable 
development in the global south, the network has grown to include more local NGOs (also referred 
to as SNGOs in the literature). Together, these three sets of actors (NNGOs, SNGOs and donors) 
work in close connection to establish priorities, develop programmatic responses to global 
problems, and share resources. The NGO chain, presented in Figure 1, illustrates how NGOs are 
connected to other actors in any given policy domain. The figure illustrates that funding is 
transferred through donors and governments to two-tiers of NGOs, both NNGOs and SNGOs. 
Generally, NGOs act as mediators between the donors and beneficiaries, but NGOs are often 
themselves donors.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
In the food security network, NGOs operate in an environment of collaborative interaction 
and connectivity. The presence of donors in this network, however, makes NGO collaboration and 
partnership essential for survival. NGOs that are relatively isolated from the donor community tend 
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to become weak competitors against already strong NGO-donor alliances. Donors tend to fund 
projects with NGOs that have developed strong relations with the agencies and work in locations 
targeted by donors. Thus, from an organizational survival standpoint, NGOs need to collaborate to 
survive. The literature also suggests that collaborated responses produce greater results for 
beneficiaries, enabling NGOs to remain mission-driven while building inter-organizational 
relationships that further expand their reach (Sabatier 2007; Yanacopulos 2005; Florini 2000; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 1993; Nelson 1997; Heclo 1972).  
NGO interaction takes different forms. For example, NGOs collaborate on funding 
proposals, establish best practices, and assist each other in providing housing and protection in the 
field. Food security projects are themselves co-dependent (Pinstrup-Andersen 1999). When NGOs 
work in the same country and cooperate with the same donors, they are connected intimately in the 
field.  The response to food security issues requires collaborated efforts, such as simultaneously 
addressing food insecurity alongside HIV/AIDS, access to clean water, the development of 
sanitation infrastructure, and educating the community on all of the aforementioned.   NGOs in the 
field tend to collaborate efforts based on their collective comparative advantage.  Their 
interventions, then, tend to be connected.  The collaborated efforts suggest that NGOs operating in 
the same country, under the same donor, have programmatic connections.   
Across all sectors, INGOs have formed partnerships, such as LINGOS (Learning in  
NGOs) and InterAction, which encourage inter-organizational collaboration and information 
sharing.  Madon (1999) argues that international NGOs are key to the information and knowledge 
sharing processes that lead to global policy change. She posits that changing from operational and 
service delivery to advocacy requires a greater ability to learn, which is strengthened by international 
institutional ties. Learning, in turn, facilitates better relationships with donors and better measures of 
accountability.  
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 The unique challenge of operating in tumultuous environments with limited resources drives a 
cultural adaptation of a network structure. When NGOs operate as a network, they communicate 
frequently, in the field and through national headquarters, share human and capital resources, and 
initiate programs based on comparative advantage. Stoddard (2003) observes that while large NGOs 
operate programs in multiple sectors, most NGOs in fact have particular operational niches—for 
example, CARE (food security), Médecins Sans Frontières (health), and Oxfam (sanitation) —or, 
like Save the Children, direct their programs at particular classes of beneficiaries. Therefore, isolating 
and examining specific sectors within the global NGO community may yield insights about 
prominent actors and their relationships, the composition of which is likely to vary. In sum, NGOs 
have often become mutually dependent.  As modern emergencies increase and the scale of demands 
rises, NGOs must coordinate their limited capacities to effectively respond.  Generally NGOs lack 
the breadth or technical expertise and capital resources to launch responses in isolation. Considering 
the co-dependence between and among INGOs an examination into their work without considering 
the network structure within which they operate is incomplete.  
In most sectors, including those pertinent to food security, resources are scarce. Resource 
allocation decisions are rarely driven by objective assessments of need alone, but are also greatly 
influenced by proximity to the problem as well as ideological and political concerns. State interests 
and government donors are likely to set the agenda, while international and local NGOs implement 
programs that are closest to the communities they serve. Because power asymmetries exist within 
the NGO community, and these are reflected in their relationships with donors and other NGOs, 
examination of their interactions will shed light on the structure of the food security network. 
Ohanyan (2009: 498) argues “NGOs vary widely in their inﬂuence over global policy outcomes, and 
that inﬂuence is contingent on an NGO’s external network environment. Moreover, NGO 
autonomy is sensitive to the network structure in which the NGO operates rather than the ﬁnancial 
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or organizational resources of the donors funding the NGO, as commonly believed in the 
literature.” A network analytic approach can illustrate which NGOs act as general conduits of 
information and to what extent local NGOs are integrated into the response, suggesting possible 
avenues to simplify connections, reduce transaction costs, and improve food security programming 
globally. 
   
Power and Survival in the Food Security Network  
To be a powerful actor in the food security network means more than the possession of financial 
resources and personnel. To be sure, such resources are important to NGOs. For example, CARE is 
one of the largest NGOs in the United States, operating with budget and staff numbers that far 
exceed many other organizations, such as Africare, Concern Worldwide, and Food for the Hungry. 
But some NGOs that lack these material resources have managed to become prominent in the food 
security network, and effective in carrying out their missions, by virtue of the relationships they 
develop with other NGOs at both the international and local levels. Catholic Relief Services, for 
example, has built strategic partnerships with World Vision and CARE to expand their reach and 
deliver food packages to insecure environments they might not otherwise be able to reach.  In 
addition, CRS is not solely reliant on short-term contracts from state donors.  Due to their religious 
affiliation, they are able to diversify funds by reaching out to Catholic dioceses in the United States 
and Europe.  
 We expect that material resources do, to some extent, go hand-in-hand with the 
development of ties among NGOs and donors, and that those ties, in turn, generate opportunities 
for accessing additional resources. However, there is also reason to believe that some actors, poor in 
material resources, are able to make up for these disadvantages in carrying out their missions by 
relying more heavily on relationships they have built over time with other actors in the food security 
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network—that is, their social capital (Boli and Thomas 1999; Putnam 2000; Florini 2000; Salamon 
2000). “NGOs live in a world where financial capital is highly dependent on social capital—the 
reputation of an organization is directly related to its ability to raise funds from governments and 
individuals” (Salm 1999: 95). 
 Both internal capacity (financing, staff, and volunteers) and external capacity (collaborations 
with other NGOs, local partners, and donors) are essential to an NGO’s effectiveness and longevity 
in the food security sector. NGOs need to balance external cooperation and coordination with the 
internal imperatives of organizational survival and growth. NGOs have developed strategies for 
both organizational capacity-building and the development of external relations.  
NGO need to diversify funds. They also must deal with human resource shortages, and 
therefore are constantly engaged in recruiting and retaining a highly skilled workforce. They must 
direct resources to fundraising activities, which comes at some cost to assets available to implement 
their assistance programs. Externally, they need to collaborate with other NGOs while at the same 
time competing with them to secure scarce funding. NGOs also strive to maintain their autonomy, 
balancing demands from donors against their own philosophies and experiences concerning what 
works best in the field and what promotes the heath of the organization itself. Managing both 
internal and external relations can lead to competing initiatives to scale up and scale out; they must 
decide when to use resources to build up internal capacity and when to collaborate and build 
network capacity.  A thriving organization strikes a balance between external coordination and 
internal capacity building.  
 
Developing Internal Capacity and External Coordination 
There is a limited, yet compelling body of literature that supports the claim that NGO leaders need 
distinct skills and competencies, different from other for-profit and government organizations 
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(Smillie 1995; Fowler 1997; Eade 2000; Lewis 2001; Smillie and Hailey 2001; Edwards and Fowler 
2002; Hailey and James 2004; James et al. 2005). In addition, management and leadership personnel 
have been increasingly difficult to recruit and retain. International NGOs, as a consequence, suffer 
from a whole slew of human resource difficulties relating to the recruitment and retention of 
talented staff, the availability of competitive pay and benefits, and the creation of an organizational 
culture that fosters professional development and advancement opportunities (Salamon 2003). 
 The literature suggests that there is great concern within the NGO community regarding the 
lack of qualified applicants available for senior leadership roles. The pool of candidates suitable for 
promotion from within is limited. Nor is it easy to transition candidates with relevant experience and 
talent from outside the sector into NGO leadership positions, given these organizations’ unique 
attributes and the challenges they face. “It is estimated that in the United States alone over half a 
million new senior managers will have to be developed for leadership positions in the period of 
2007-2016” (Hailey 2006: 8; see also CIVICUS 2002). 
One of the most prevalent factors affecting NGOs’ ability to retain quality leaders, especially 
in senior positions, is the environment within which leaders must live and work (Fowler 1997; 
Smillie and Hailey 2001; Hailey 2006). Research on social identity theory suggests that the way 
leaders act is directly related to how they see their role in relation to the group; however, “most 
studies of leadership are divorced from the broader social context within which these roles and 
qualities emerge” (Haslam 2001: 58). An increasing number of NGO leaders are working in trying 
social situations. Their personal vision in relation to the communities in which they work affects 
their psychological well-being and leadership style.  For example, long periods of work in and 
around communities affected by starvation is associated with high rates of employee burnout and 
resignations (Hailey and James 2004; James 2005). 
International NGOs are also notorious for offering limited opportunities for personnel 
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advancement and development. Human resource development is dependent not only on the 
retention of competent staff, but also on the organization’s internal capacity to develop such 
individuals. Lack of leadership positions in an organization can limit development opportunities, 
especially in smaller nonprofit organizations (Jiang 2008).  In larger NGOs, such as Save the 
Children and Oxfam, these challenges are easier to confront because there are more opportunities 
for mobility within the organization. Some report that turnover within the NGO community is at an 
all-time high due in no small part to a dearth of opportunities for professional advancement 
(Salamon 2003; Hailey 2006).  
 The challenges of staff recruitment and retention, and the consequent push to build internal 
capacity compete with the organization’s imperative to dedicate resources to fundraising and 
programming. These and other demands on NGO resources lead to more donor dependency and 
encourages increased partnerships within the NGO community—international and local, northern 
and southern—in an effort to pool and leverage limited capacities. The food security network has 
become more complex as a result, and navigating this terrain requires that more staff and other 
resources be dedicated to coordination and relationship building. When successful, the NGO’s 
ability to reach its beneficiaries is improved. When not, the effort can further diminish the 
organizations internal capacity and undermine its humanitarian mission.  
 Developing external capacity means building effective donor relationships and creating 
working relationships with other NGOs. Evidence suggests that tightly run capital campaigns and 
collaborative NGO networks have a greater impact on both external funding and effective advocacy. 
The anti-landmine campaign is an example of NGOs forming a purposive international network and 
ultimately influencing the policy agenda of a majority of states and key IGOs. This network 
developed as a result of strategic relationships between and among international and local NGOs. 
Yanacopulos (2005) argues that resource dependent NGOs develop preferences for three 
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strategies: coalition building, tactical lobbying, and coordinated campaigning. Nelson (1996) also 
argues that coalitions form the basis for exerting influence over donors. NGOs face a greater push 
to use partnerships, as the southern or less developed countries fight for a voice in their own 
development (Salm 1999). However, where more coordinated effort and partnerships can lead to 
pooled resources and greater reach, it can also lead to irrelevance or loss of autonomy, whereby 
NGOs begin to experience countervailing imperatives, resist cooperation, and strike more 
competitive postures. In different situational contexts, NGOs must balance the need to cooperate 
with the need to maintain internal capacity and remain relevant within the food security network.  
 NGO success also depends on relationships with donors in the network. As Ohanyan (2009: 
476) states, “the inherent richness of the interplay between NGOs and their donors mediates the 
linkage between power differentials and policy outcomes.” Studies have pointed to the frequency of 
complicated, often paternalistic relationships between donors and NGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
Edwards 1999; Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Nelson 1997). Relationships that form between donors 
and NGOs are of three main types: patron-client, as representative-constituent, and principal-agent 
(Ahmed and Potter 2006: 108-110; Jordan 2000). Each of these relationships is, in its own way, 
asymmetric (Madon 1999). As NGOs face resource scarcity, they are vulnerable to donor demands 
and priorities.  Even when they operate under a representative and constituent relationship, the 
NGO represents the interests of the donor through acceptance of funds. Currently, CARE and Save 
the Children have budgets with over fifty percent government short-term contracts.  
 NGOs have expanded organizational capacities to make the best of these relationships, 
although their humanitarian missions have not always been well served. Madon (1999), for example, 
posits that there are costs to NGOs behaving like “public service” contractors in their effort to 
adopt the proper mixture of assets in the service of both humanitarianism and pragmatism.  As 
NGOs begin servicing state needs and developing an uneven balance of ODA and private funds, 
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they weaken their ability to assess situations on the ground and make need-based decisions to 
allocate resources.  NGOs like Mercy Corps, which operate in food insecure environments such as 
Somalia, are at the mercy of donor agencies.  Most donor agencies have allocated limited resources 
to Somalia despite the growing levels of malnutrition and starvation, leaving the NGOs who operate 
there little room to develop programs that address the actual needs.  Instead, NGOs that are highly 
dependent on donor agency funds may choose to service the perceived needs of the bureaucrats 
rather than the perceived needs of the food insecure.   
 Moreover, NGOs acting as public service contractors become open to scrutiny.  The purpose 
of NGO activity was initially to act where governments could not or would not.  Servicing 
government grants, however, leads NGOs back to being less apolitical and less able to challenge 
states on areas of food security programming. Cooley and Ron (2002: 13) state that “when an 
organization’s survival depends on making strategic choices in a market environment characterized 
by uncertainty, its interests will be shaped, often unintentionally, by material incentives.”  Thus, 
when NGOs become public service contractors they are likely to accept perverse incentives to 
secure survival.  
 
Network Data Analysis 
 The data analysis presented in this section is largely descriptive and derives from a larger project just 
getting underway on humanitarian assistance by international and local NGOs supported by a 
variety of both state and nonstate donors. Thus, conceptually, the humanitarian networks we 
examine comprise two types of actors: NGOs and donors. Subsequent work will disaggregate the 
NGO category into international and local NGOs, but for now we limit ourselves to an examination 
of INGOs. Further, the initial stage of data collection, and this paper, is focused on the food 
security sector. The data we compile come primarily from two locations. InterAction is an 
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association of U.S.-based INGOs and maintains a website that includes, among other information, 
“aid maps” showing the geographic distribution of aid projects; we consulted the Food Security Aid 
Map (see foodsecurity.ngoaidmap.org). From information attached to this map, we collected data on 
979 food aid projects, involving 47 secular and religious INGOs and 99 donors. The donors are 
government agencies, foundations, private corporations, and NGOs themselves. Our other primary 
data source is GuideStar, which provides financial and other statistics on nonprofit organizations; we 
discuss this information below. 
 
Measuring Network Links 
To analyze these data, we employ various descriptive methods from social network analysis (SNA). 
At its most inclusive, the food security network we study consists of 146 nodes, both INGOs and 
donors, although we also look at subsets of just INGOs and just donors. We have experimented 
with operationalizing the links between these nodes in various ways. Links between donors and 
INGOs are most straightforward: a link exists between two nodes if the donor has funded one or 
more projects implemented by the INGO. Links between INGOs and between donors are more 
problematic. Ideally, in the case of INGOs, a link between two INGOs would exist if the two are 
working together in the field on a common aid project, but our data at this stage do not allow us to 
discern this. INGOs use unique project names for their activities, which do not match the project 
names used by other INGOs even when they are working closely in the field. The question becomes 
which alternative, indirect measures best proxy the sorts of direct working relationships we are 
interested in examining. 
 Almost by definition, INGOs that work together in the field work in the same sector, each 
of which has a food security dimension: agriculture; disaster management; economic recovery and 
development; education; environment; food aid; health; human rights, democracy, and governance; 
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peace and security; protection; shelter and housing; water, sanitation, and hygiene. We suspect that 
an operational measure that posits a link between two INGOs based on their work within the same 
sector will overestimate the extent of working ties within the INGO community. We cannot show 
this until we have data on direct ties, but the density of the INGO network (i.e., excluding donors) 
when links are operationalized in this way is unrealistically high. In a network with s nodes, the 
maximum number of directed ties between them is s(s − 1); half that if the ties are undirected. The 
density of same-sector (undirected) links in the INGO network, that is, the proportion of all 
possible ties present, is 0.93. 
When we operationalize links as existing when two INGOs work in at least one country in 
common, network density is 0.57; when the INGOs are funded by a common donor, 0.20. Our 
hunch is that the best proxy for INGO-INGO ties is a combination of these latter two measures: a 
link exists if the INGOs are funded by a common donor and work in a common country. In this 
case, network density is 0.15 and Figure 2 shows the corresponding “sociogram.” InterAction 
provides information on project location at the subnational level as well, and further refinement of 
the geographic element of our proxy indicator is possible. Ultimately, however, we should prefer a 
direct measure of INGO-INGO ties. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 Ascertaining ties between donors in the absence of direct indicators is no less difficult. 
Proceeding with an approach similar to that just described, the alternative proxies each yield donor 
network densities considerable lower than observed in the INGO networks, although this is partly 
an artifact of the larger number of donor nodes and possible links among them. When donor ties are 
operationalized as existing if two donors fund projects in at least one country in common, density is 
0.13; when they fund at least one INGO in common, 0.12; and when they do both in common, 0.03. 
As with INGOs, we suggest that this last, compound measure of donor-donor ties is best and least 
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likely to overestimate actual relationships between donors. But, again, and perhaps even more so 
than in the case of INGOs, we think it important to develop a direct measure of these relationships. 
Figure 3 shows this donor sociogram. Figure 4 shows the sociogram of the full food security 
network—INGOs and donors, with ties between and among them—although visual inspection of 
this figure is unlikely to give more than very general impression of the structural complexity that 
needs to be examined. 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Material Resources and Social Capital 
In addition to structural properties of the food security network, like density, we are interested in 
properties of actors, both INGOs and donors, which derive from their positions and connectivity 
within the network. Above we discussed the difference between INGOs material resources, like 
financing and personnel, and their social capital, which derives from their relationships with other 
actors in the network. SNA includes various techniques for measuring the prominence of network 
nodes and their strategic positioning relative to other nodes and groupings. 
 Social network data are arranged as a square “sociomatrix” in which there is both a row and 
a column for each node in the network. A cell in the matrix contains a 1 if the actor represented by 
row i, designated ni, had a relationship with the actor represented by column j, designated nj, in 
which case xij = 1; otherwise xij = 0. Some of our data are nondirectional in that a tie between two 
nodes represents a conjectured relationship rather than a sent or received communication or other 
exchange; thus, xij = xji. But in subsequent research on, for example, ties connecting donors and 
INGOs, it may be useful to consider directional ties. In this case, an actor’s outdegree, d(ni), is the 
number of other actors to whom that actor has directed some form of communication or exchange 
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(for example, funding); indegree, d(nj), is the number of actors from whom a communication or 
exchange has been received. That is, 
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which are, respectively, the row i and column j totals of the sociomatrix. 
In most social networks, certain actors are more prominent than others and the evidence of 
their prominence is often the number and type of social ties they maintain with other actors. The 
centrality of a network actor is sometimes indexed as its outdegree or indegree (or both), but since 
these measures are greatly affected by the number of actors in a network, it is useful to normalize 
the index. Thus, the normalized outdegree and indegree centrality indexes can be computed as 
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Again, because the data we use for this analysis are nondirectional—the sociomatrix is symmetric—
the formulas in (2) give the same result. Figure 5 arranges INGOs so that those with the highest 
degree centralities are positioned nearer the center of ten concentric rings, while those with lower 
scores are positioned nearer the periphery. Catholic Relief Services and World Vision, both religious 
organizations, are the most prominent INGOs in the social network according to this measure, 
followed by Food for the Hungry, International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps, Winrock 
International, and Save the Children, all secular. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 Are these INGOs, with potentially high levels of social capital, also organizations with the 
greatest material resources at their disposal? GuideStar, a provider of information on U.S.-based 
nonprofits, reports various statistics taken from IRS Forms 990, which are filed by tax-exempt 
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organizations (see www.guidestar.org). For each of the INGOs examined here, we have collected 
data on net revenue, number of employees, and number of volunteers. Some of the same INGOs 
with high centrality measures—Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, and Mercy Corps—are 
also among the top ten in terms of revenue and employees, but the others rank below this in one or 
both measures of material resources. Indeed, overall, there is a low correlation between INGOs’ 
degree centrality and their revenue (r = 0.12), employees (r = 0.07), and volunteers (r = −0.14). In an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of degree centrality on revenue, employees, and the 
number of aid projects undertaken by the INGO, the model explains only 11 percent of the variance 
in centrality. Thus, these measures of material and social capital are tapping distinct attributes of 
these actors, with possibly different implications for the influence and efficacy in the food security 
network. 
 
Predicting Reach 
If these material and social measures are highlighting different dimension of potential importance 
and influence within the aid network, the question arises whether we can differentiate their relative 
impact on INGOs’ delivery of benefits to their constituency, those living in the shadow of food 
insecurity. What factors predict the number of aid projects that these INGOs undertake? What 
factors predict the number of people they reach? Causality will be difficult to disentangle in any 
effort to answer these questions. INGO fundraising efforts with donors often are pitched with 
specific projects in mind and specific needy populations, in which case (desired) outcomes are 
“causes” of revenue flows and human resource acquisition. The same may be said about INGO 
partnerships, which we have proposed is a source of social capital: existing partnerships are likely to 
be enhanced and new partnerships initiated in response to anticipated projects and unanticipated 
need. Although such issues of causality will be addressed in the course of our ongoing research, for 
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now we set them aside and simply offer some preliminary findings on material and social capacity as 
predictors of INGO reach. 
 In addition to the data discussed above, InterAction also reports estimates of the number of 
people reached by each of the 979 food aid projects that we use to construct our network dataset, 
which we have summed for each of the 47 INGOs in the network. Table 1 shows some descriptive 
statistics for this variable and others, including degree centrality. Clearly, the INGO community 
active in food security activities displays a wide range of capacities. While Catholic Relief Services is 
the most central actor in the network by our measure, the American Red Cross has both the largest 
revenue and the largest number of employees, and World Vision is involved in the most projects, 
which together reach the most people. Toward the other end of the spectrum on these measures are 
such organizations as Baptist World Alliance, Plant with Purpose, and African Medical and Research 
Corporation. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 We use OLS regression to estimate the impact of INGO capacity on the number of projects 
they undertake and the number of people they reach. For projects, using millions of dollars in 
revenue, hundreds of employees, and degree centrality (rescaled from 1 to 10) as regressors, the 
estimating equation is: 
 
 Projects = 6.11 + 0.11(Revenue) – 1.09(Employees) + 7.35(Centrality) (3) 
   (0.02)  (0.23)  (3.50) 
 
 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the parameter estimates, all of which are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. The model explains 44 percent of the variance in INGO food security 
projects. An increase in ten million dollars in revenue is associated with an increase in one food aid 
project, while an increase in one hundred employees corresponds to a decrease in one project. The 
negative sign on the parameter estimate for employees seems counterintuitive, but the finding makes 
Kraner/Kinsella (ISA 2012)  20 
more sense in the context of the model we report next. Most relevant for our purposes is that 
network centrality, our measure of an INGO’s social capital, is positively associated with program 
participation. A one unit increase on the 1-10 centrality scale is associated with an increase in seven 
food security programs, controlling for material resources. 
 Regressing the total number of people reached by the INGO, in tens of thousands, on the 
same independent variables plus projects gives this estimating equation: 
 
 Reached = −148 + 1.56(Revenue) – 14.36(Employees) + 5.00(Projects) + 166(Centrality) (4) 
  (0.33) (3.50)  (1.90) (45) 
 
 
All parameter estimates are statistically significant and the model explains 71 percent of the variance 
in number of people reached. The results generally conform to those for the model predicting 
projects. A one million dollar increase in revenue is associated with an increase in 15 thousand 
beneficiaries, while an increase in one project corresponds to 50 thousand more beneficiaries. Again 
we see a negative parameter estimate for the impact on increasing the number of employees: one 
hundred more employees means 140 thousand fewer people reached by the INGO. The negative 
sign suggests that, for a given level of revenue, a larger number of employees acts as a drag on 
resources and diminishes the organization’s reach. (The magnitude of this estimated effect does 
seem implausibly high, however.) As with projects, the number of people reached increases with 
higher levels of INGO centrality: a one unit increase in centrality is associated with 1.7 million more 
beneficiaries. These organizations’ social connectedness, not just their material resources, increases 
their reach. 
 
Bringing Donors Back In 
Our analysis in this paper has focused primarily on INGOs in the food security network, but we 
offer a couple observations about donors before concluding. Figure 4 above, a sociogram of both 
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INGOs and donors, was difficult to decipher, but the degree centrality map shown in Figure 6 
allows us to observe the most prominent among both types of actors. The most central INGOs 
shown above—Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, Save the Children, Food for the Hungry, 
Mercy Corps—remain toward the middle of the chart, but their prominence exists alongside donors 
like USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the 
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection unit, each of which are, of course, 
governmental donors. Among the more prominent nongovernmental donors are UNICEF and the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. But in general, as we have operationalized links between nodes, 
INGOs are more connected than donors. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 When we examine only the funding ties connecting donors to INGOs, a disproportionate 
number of these relationships are found among the handful of INGOs and donors that we have 
highlighted as the most central in the food security network. Many networks in physical, biological, 
and social systems have this sort of “scale-free” structure (Barabási and Albert 1999; Barabási and 
Bonabeau 2003). In contrast to random networks, in which links or social ties are distributed 
randomly across the nodes, scale-free networks consist of some nodes with large numbers of 
connections (network hubs), and many others with very few connections. For example, Barabási and 
associates have found that links to pages on the World Wide Web have a “power law” distribution: 
  ( )      (5) 
where P(k) is the probability of a network node with k links; k is the number of links per node; and 
the exponent −γ is a constant. Figure 7 plots the distribution of k-linked nodes in this network and 
shows the fitted curve for γ = 1.43, which explains 84 percent of the variance in the frequency 
distribution. We should not make too much of this finding, given the relatively few data points, but 
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it does suggest that the “preferential attachment” observed in many networks may also be present in 
this one—that is, in the form of preferential funding. This possibility we pursue in future research. 
 
Conclusion 
NGOs have formed humanitarian advocacy networks based on informal communication structures 
and frequent programmatic connections. The food security network we examine in this paper 
consists of 47 international NGOs and 99 donors and accounts for 979 assistance projects 
worldwide. The structural elements of this sector, with further study, can provide important 
information regarding collaboration and competition among international and local NGOs and the 
donors that fund their activities. We have examined the connectivity between INGOs and donors in 
an attempt to probe this food security network and these organizations’ efforts on behalf of the one 
billion people currently living in conditions of chronic hunger and malnutrition. The results of our 
analysis, while tentative, suggest that both internal and external resources are necessary to develop 
meaningful responses to the problem of global hunger, although further research is needed to shed 
light on the appropriate mixture most conducive to delivering results under different conditions and 
organizational contexts. Building internal capacities and deploying social capital are complementary 
strategies available to these actors and we need to better understand why some NGOs may have 
preferences for divergent organizational structures and partnership portfolios.   
 Given that NGOs are likely to remain prominent and important actors in global governance, 
these preliminary findings offer motivation to find better measures of their social relations and to 
test hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of food security and other humanitarian programs. The 
trajectory of this research depends on the quality of the data we are able to compile and the 
application of appropriate analytic methods. In subsequent research, we plan to expand our data 
collection, consider direct interactions between organizations, and disaggregate the NGO 
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community into both international and local actors in an effort to better understand the ways these 
entities can operate effectively in insecure environments with finite resources. Based on our initial 
research, we have reason to believe that some organizations prefer building external relations to 
scaling up internal capacities as a means of both serving their constituents and surviving as 
organizations in a complex social and political environment.  We have also shown that NGO reach 
is related to both material capacity (revenue and staff) and the organization’s centrality in the food 
security network. The implications of this and future research may provide insight into the funding 
schemes that some skeptics believe pervert humanitarian work.    
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Figure 1: NGO Chain 
Figure adapted from Ahmed and Potter (2006). 
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Figure 2: Food Security Network: International NGOs  
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Figure 3: Food Security Network: Donors  
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Figure 4: Food Security Network: INGOs and Donors 
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Figure 5: INGO Centrality: Common Donor and Country Ties 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for INGO Capacity and Reach 
 mean maximum minimum std. deviation 
revenue 218,152,654 3,587,775,430 360,928 570,622,301 
employees 1,813 35,103 6 5,304 
projects 21 280 1 48 
reached 2,826,176 48,090,762 2,700 8,243,371 
centrality 0.15 0.57 0.00 0.16 
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Figure 6: INGO and Donor Centrality: Funding and Other Ties 
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Figure 7: Distribution of Funding Tied in Food Security Network 
